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INTRODUCTION
The theory of games of strategy may be described as a mathematical
theory of decision-making by participants in a competitive environment.
Sonne common examples of games of strategy are such parlor games as
chess, bridge, and poker, where the players make use of their ingenuity
to outwit each other. The theory of games is gaining importance because
of its general applicability to real-life situations which involve conflicting
interests in which the outcome is partially controlled by one side and
partially by the opposing side of the conflict. Military attack and defense
of targets against attack, and economic price conapetition between two
sellers, are real-life games of strategy.
Game theory does not describe how a game should be played but rather
what strategy a player should select assuming that his opponent chooses
his best possible strategy. The theory of games assumes that a player
attenapts to select a strategy which maximizes his smallest gain (security
level).
Games of chance have been studied mathematically for many years.
The mathematical theory of probability has resulted from such study. The
French mathematician Emile Borel, in 19^1, miade one of the first attempts
to abstract games of strategy into a mathematical theory of strategy with
the formulation of what is now part of the minimax theory, but he was held
back by his failure to prove this theorem (8).
John von Neumann, on December 7, 1926, gave a talk to the
Mathematical Society in Gottingen in which he proved parts of the minimax
theorenn (8). However, it was not until 1944, with the publication of
Theory of Games of Economic Behavior
, by von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern, that the mathennatical theory of games received much
attention (4). Dr. Morgenstern is a professor of economics (at Princeton);
some chapters of the book stress economic significance of the results of
game theory.
Terminology and Classification
A game of strategy is described by its set of rules which specify
clearly what each person called a "player" is allowed to do under all
possible circumstances. The rules of any game must specify in advance
which moves, known as "information sets, " are indistinguishable to the
players. When an information set consists of a single naove, the player
is totally informed. When all the moves are of this type the game is
said to have perfect information. Ticktacktoe and chess are examples
of games whose rules result in perfect information.
The word "play" will be employed to denote the number of times a
particular game is played. The word "move" will mean a point in the
game at which one of the players selects one of a set of alternatives. The
word "choice" will mean the alternative selected. The following example
uses this terminology.
Black won the third play of the (chess) game by a clever
choice on his tenth move.
A game is finite if each player has a finite number of moves and a
finite number of choices available at each move; other gannes are called
infinite. Games are classified according to the number of players, i. e.
,
as 2-person, 3-person, etc. It is convenient to distinguish between
games whose pay-offs are zero- sum and those which are not. Consider
a play of an n-person game with players P , P , . . . , P and let
0.(i=l, 2, . . . , n) be the payment made to P. at the end of the play. Then if
we call the play zero- sum. If every possible play of a game is zero- sum,
the game itself is called a zero- sum game. All other games are called
non-zero-sum games.
Mathematical Formulation
To simplify the mathematical description of a game, each player
formulates in advance a plan for playing the game from the beginning to
the end, instead of making his decision at each move. Such a complete
plan of play is called a strategy of that player. A strategy must be
complete and cover all possible conditions that may arise in the play.
Suppose that one of the players, Blue, has m strategies, which
correspond to the numbers
i = 1, Z, . . . , m.
Suppose the other player. Red, has n strategies, which correspond to
j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Every pair of strategies, one strategy for each player, determines a
play of the game. Thus a play of a game consists of each player making
one decision, the selection of a strategy. These two choices determine
a play of the game and a pay-off to the two players. Let a., be the pay-
off to Blue. The pay-off to Red is -a., in a two-person zero-sum game.
The game is thus determined by Blue's pay-off matrix.
A=(a..)
ij m X n
^11 ^12
^21 ^ZZ
In
2n
a . a
-, ... a
ml m2 mn
In this matrix each Blue strategy is represented by a row; each Red
.th
strategy is represented by a column. If Blue chooses the i strategy
or row i and Red chooses the j strategy or column j, then Red is to
pay Blue the amount a... Blue wants a., to be as large as possible, but
ij ij
he controls only the choice of his strategy i. Red wants a., to be as
small as possible, but he controls only the choice of j. Hence, we have
a conflict; Blue maximizing a., by his choice of i, and Redminimizing
a., by his choice of j. Blue will be referred to as the maximizing player
and Red the minimizing player.
As an illustration of a game of strategy, consider the following
simplified version of the game known as NIM, for which general rules
and description can be found in many places including (1, pp. 36-38).
Let two piles P and P of two items each be given. The player
Red takes either one or two items from one pile. Let this pile be called
P . Player Blue then draws one or two items from either pile. The
drawing continues until the player picking up the last item loses.
The following ganne tree shows the possible succession of moves of
Red and Blue. Here, the notation, (x, y) means that the first pile contains
X items and the second pile contains y items. On Red's first move he is
faced with (2, 2) which means there are two items in each pile. After
Red's first move. Blue is faced with either (1, 2), one in the pile P and
two in the pile P or (0, 2), two in the pile P .
Move of:
Red
Blue
Red
(2,2)
L__
(1,2) (0,2)
(0,2)
I
(1,1)
Blue (0,0)
win for
Blue
Red
—II
—
(0,1) "(^0)
I
(1.0)
I
(0,0)
win for
Red
(0,77
I
(0,0)
win for
Blue
(0,0)
win for
Red
Each player decides, in advance, what he will do in any possible
situation and all of these decisions together form a strategy.
The player's strategies are given in the following tables. The
column headed Move Number is the number of the move by the player.
The column headed by Condition Before Move lists all the possible con-
ditions which the player might meet on the particular move in the first
column. The column under the heading Condition After Move lists in
each column the condition in which the player leaves the game if he
uses the strategy above the column. If such a position is not possible
using a certain strategy, this is shown by dashes (--).
Move
Numbe r
Condition
Before Move
Condition After Move
Red's Strategies
1 2 3 4 5
1 {2.,Z) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2) (0.2)
2
(0,2) (0,1) (0,0) (0,1) (0,0) --
(1,1) (0,1) (0,1) (1,0) (1.0) --
(1.0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0.0) --
(0,1) -- -- -- - _. (0.0)
For example. Red's first strategy consists of the following moves:
To begin with, he is faced with position (2, 2). Red will take one item
from P^ thus changing the position to (1, 2). At Red's second move
he may be faced with (0, 2) if Blue has taken the remaining item from
Pj. Red may be faced with (1, 1) if Blue has taken one item from P ,
with (1,0) if Blue has taken two items from P , but Red will not be
faced with (0, 1) shown by the dashes in the strategy 1 column. Red
decides that if he were faced with (0, 2) he would reduce this to (0, 1),
if with (1, 1) to (0, 1) and if with (1, 0) he would reduce this to (0, 0).
Red's other strategies are similarly given in the table.
Blue strategies are tabulated as follows:
Move
Numbe r
Condition
Before Move
Condition After Move
•
Blue's Strategies
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 (1,2) (0,2) (0.2) (1,1) (1,1) (1,0) (1,0)
(0,2) (0,0) (0,1) (0,0) (0.1) (0,0) (0,1)
2
(0.1) (0,0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) --
(1.0) -- -- (0.0) (0.0) -- --
The reduction of a game's structure to strategies is called
normalization. There exists an elaborate theory referring to games
in their extensive form (i. e.
, taking account of the succession of
moves and, in particular, of the pattern of information). This paper
will not discuss this aspect of game theory.
Blue
Strategy
1 -1
2 -1
3 -1
4 -i
5 1
6
Col. Max.
The pay-off matrix to Blue is as follows (where 1 denotes a win
and -la loss by Blue).
Red
2 3 4 5 Row Min.
-1
1
-1
1
-1
1
1
In addition to the pay-off matrix an extra column and row have
been added giving the row minimum and column maximum respectively.
This represents the least amount a player can receive from a strategy
and is called the security level of that strategy. For Red, the column
maximum represents the worst that could happen if he uses each strategy;
a loss might occur. For Blue the row minimum for Blue's sixth strategy
is +1 so the worst that could happen if Blue uses his sixth strategy is
that he would win. Thus, Blue maximizes his security level by selecting
strategy six.
The game just represented is a game of perfect information because
every previous move is at all times known to each of the players. This
game possesses a special feature in that there was an entry in the pay-off
matrix which was the smallest in its row and at the same time the
largest in its column. Such an element is called a saddle point. If
Blue were to announce in advance that he planned to play strategy six,
Red could not take advantage and reduce Blue's pay-off. Similarly,
if Red were to announce which strategy he was using. Blue could not
increase his own pay-off.
MATRIX GAMES
A two-person zero-sum game P consists of a pair of sets I and J
and a real valued function defined on the pairs (i, j) where i€ I and
j ^ J. The elements i€ I and j ^ J are called the strategies for players
Blue and Red respectively. The function is called the pay-off function.
The pay-off function is represented by the game matrix A = (a..).
J
Consider the general pay-off matrix A = (a..) for any strategy i
which Blue chooses; he can be sure of receiving at least
min a.
.
,
where the minimum is taken over all of Red's strategies. Since Blue is
at liberty to choose i, he can make his choice in such a way as to insure
that he receives at least
max mm a
. . ,
iCI j £J ^J
10
called the maxmin of F . Similarly, for any strategy j which Red may
choose, he can be sure Blue gets no more than
max a.. .
i€I y
Since Red is at liberty to choose j, he can choose it in such a way that
Blue gets at most
min max a..
,
j ( J ia '^
called the minmax of P. These two quantities in general are different,
and a relationship between them is given by the theorem:
Theorem 1:
If is a function of x and y, for which
min max (x, y)
yf Y xeX
and
max miin (x, y)
x6Xy€ Y
exist, then
max min (x, y) S min max (x, y)
x£XyeY y£YxeX
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Proof:
From the definition of minimum, given any x^X, one has
min (x, y) :S iZ) (x, y) .
y€Y
From the definition of maximum, given any y6Y, one has
(x, y)S max (x, y)
x£X
Hence, combining the above two inequalities.
min (x, y) S (x, y) s max (x, y)
y£Y x€X
Since the right-hand side of the preceding inequalities is
independent of x,
max min (x, y) ^ max (x, y) .
x€X yeY x€X
Since the left-hand side of the saine inequalities is independent of y.
max min (x, y) < min max (x, y)
x^X ycY y €Y x€X
Games with Saddle -Points
If the preceding inequality becomes an equality.
12
max mm a.. = mm max a.. = v,
iil jCJ ^^ j€J i<I ^-^
then Blue can choose a strategy so as to receive at least the common
value and Red can keep Blue from getting more than v. The strategies
for Blue and Red respectively i*!*, j*!* which guarantee this value v are
referred to as optimal strategies. This pair of strategies is called
the solution of the game.
Suppose |5 is a real valued function such that 0(i, j) is defined ie.1
and J€J; then a point a. , . , where i*€l and j*€ J is called a saddle-point
of if
1). (iJ'iO^ (i*,j") for all iej and
2). (i-, j-) ^ {i-,j) for all j£j.
A necessary and sufficient condition for a game to have a
saddle -point is that there exists an element of the pay-off matrix which
is simultaneously the minimum of its row and the maximum of its
column. A game may have several saddle -points. In such a case all
the saddle -points have the same value.
Theorem 2:
The equality
max min (i,j) = min max (i, j)
id j 6J j€j ici
13
holds if, and only if, has a saddle -point.
Proof:
If (i*,j*) is a saddle -point, then for all j€ J and iel
(i,j>:0 < (i*.j'^), (1)
(i*,j*) < (i*,j). (2)
Since the inequality (1) is true for all i€l,
max (i, j^-) ^ (i-SJ^^O-
i€l
Since the inequality (2) is true for all j € J,
(i'SJ-) i min (i*,j),
Combining the above inequalities, one has
max {i,j-) < (i=:=,j*) < min (i^:<,j
Ul j.J <^'
From the definition i*;= and j=:% it follows that
min max (i, j) < max (i, j-!')
j^J i^I i€l
and
min (i*, j) ^ max min (i,j).
j€J i^I jej
14
Therefore,
min max ^ (i, j)^ (i'-SJ'!-) ^ max min (i, j). ..,
j €J iti iti j€
J
^
'
But by theorem 1, the left member of (4) is not less than max min (i, j).
i t I j € J
Hence, all three members are equal.
min max (i, j) = (i-'SJ'-') = max min (i, j).
jej ici i€ I j (c J
Conversely, let i*6 I and y'^ €. j such that.
max min (i, j) = rnin (i-'SJ)
i€I j € J j€J
and
miin max (i, j) = max (i, j*),
j£j i€l i€l
Since
min max (i, j) = (i-sj*) = max min (i, j),
j€j i€I i^I j€J
the equations above lead to the result:
min (i'^j) = max (i, j-=}.
j€J i6l (5)
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From the definition of a minimum.
min <b (i*,j) i {i'-,j^
(6)
and a maximum,
(i*,j*) < max (i, j-).
i€l (7)
Substituting into equation (5), the definitions from (6) and (7),
one has
(i-, j-) ^ min (i-, j)
(i-.j*) ^ max (i, j^).
iel
Therefore,
(i^j-) < (i-,j) for all jf J
(i=:sj*) > (i,j=:0 for all i< I
satisfy the definition of a saddle -point.
The game corresponding to the matrix
2 6 11
3 5 2 4
Col. Max. 3 6 2=:= 4
Row Min.
1
has a saddle -point. The element in the second row and third column
is a saddle -point for the game.
16
Games with Perfect Information
In order to prove the next theorem, it is convenient to introduce
the notation of the truncation of a game of perfect information.
Truncations of a game are those games which arise frona a given
game if the first move is deleted. The number of truncations of a game
is the number of alternatives available at the first move. The strategy
of a truncation of a game picks out the same alternatives at the branch
points as does the oiiginal strategy.
Theorem 3:
If the game P with matrix (i, j) is a game of perfect information,
then r has a saddle -point.
Proof:
The proof is by induction on the length of the game. If i is of
length one (i.e. , only one move) the theorem is obvious.
Suppose the theorem is true for all games of length less than K,
Let r* be a game of length K. Suppose that there are r alternatives on
the first move, and let f^, , P^, . . ., P be the r truncations of P.12 r
For each of the games P let be the corresponding pay-off function
and I and J be the set of pure strategies for Red and Blue respectively.
u u
By the induction hypothesis, there is an equilibriunn point in each
of the sets I and J . For each P , let (i -, j *) be a saddle-point,
u u u u u
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Then,
(i ,j =:<) < (i >:<,j *) <0 (i >:<,j ) (8)
u u u u u u u u u
for u = 1 , 2, . . . , r and i C I , j <=; J .
u u u u
The game " has two cases: (1), the first move is made by chance;
or (2), the first move is made by one of the players.
Case 1. First move nnade by chance.
If q is a branch point of the truncated game P , and corresponds
to a move made by Blue or Red, set
V'r(q) = i^'l^q)
j«(q) = j (q) respectively.
Since the first move is made by chance, i'-- is defined over branch
points of 1. Thus 1=:- corresponds to a move made by Blue and is a
member of I. Similarly j-:= is a naember of J. It is sufficient to show
(i*»j''') is a saddle -point of ( .
Let the probabilities assigned to the r alternatives at the first
move be a, , a., .... a ; then12 r
r
u u" u 'u'
u=l
In particular, since i --', i =:%
. . . ,
i =!= are truncations of v'-^ and12 r
j, *, Jt*, . . . , j * are truncations of j*,
L c. r
18
u=l
u=l
and
r
u u' u "u
u=l
From (8) it follows that
r r
2 a (i ,j *)< V a (i >:<,j =^) = 0(1':% j*),*^ u u u u ~ -^ u u u u
u=l u=l
^a (i *,j )>T' a (i *,j ^) = Hi-,i-)'
•^ u u u u - ^ u u u u
u=l u=l
Hence (i*, j-^O is a saddle-point of / .
Case 2. The first move made by one of the players.
The first move may be made by either player since the proof for
Red's move is analogous to the proof for Blue's move and vice versa.
Assume the first move, q , of I is made by Blue.
Let
max (i 'Ssj =;<) = (i ^:sj >:^). (9)
u u u mm m
u < r
Define a function i* by setting
^H^q) = u and i*(q) = i^-(q)
19
for any point q in the truncated ganne s P which corresponds to a raove
made by Blue. The j* is defined as in the previous case. The strategies
i* and j^'' thus defined are strategies of I"*. It will now be shown these
strategies yield a saddle -point of I .
If i€l for Blue in Hand i is its truncation to P , thenm m
0(i*.j) = »ji^*,jj.
In particular.
;i*,j*) = (i
-,j -). (10)m m m .
Thus, j^J for Red in P, and if j is its truncation to P ,m m
0(i*,j-) = (i
-,j -)<0 (i -,j ) = </){v^,j).m m m m m rn
Suppose that
i(qQ) = u.
Let i be the truncation of i to P . Then, if j6J and j is its truncation
u u "^ u
to P ,
u
^('•J' = ^(VJu>-
In particular.
0(1, j*) = (i ,j *)
u u u
20
Now from (9),
(i
=:sj *)> (i ^:sj ^^).m m m u u u
Hence, using equation (10),
»(i*. j*) = V<W''Jm*> ^ »(V*' Ju*' ^ ^<V' Ju*' = »<^' J*''
Thus (i*, j*) is a saddle -point.
The existence of a saddle -point in the game of chess follows from
the fact that it is a game of perfect infornaation. It all the possible
strategies for chess were enumerated, optimal strategies could be found.
However, because of the large nunnber of strategies for chess, saddle-
points have not been computed. The game ticktacktce has a small number
of strategies, and so an optimal strategy can be found.
Games without Saddle -Points
Consider games whose pay-off nnatrix is such that
max min a.. < min max a.,
iei jej ^^ jej iel ^^
The left-hand side of the inequality represents Blue's minimum
security level (the least amount Blue can receive) and the right-hand
side represents the negative of Red's minimum security level (the most
Blue can receive). ^
21
The game defined by the pay-off naatrix
'l 3
4 2
does not have a saddle -point for
min max a.. = 3
j^J i^ ^-^
max min a... = 2
i^I j<J "-^
Since the ganne matrix has no saddle -point, previous methods
do not determine optimum ways for Blue and Red to play. If Red can
discover Blue's optimal strategy, Red can drive his winning down to 1
if the strategy is his first or 2 if the strategy is the second. Therefore,
if Blue's strategies were discovered, his winnings would be 1 or 2.
However, Blue is trying to get either 3 or 4.
Thus, in a game without a saddle-point, the player's strategy will
depend on his opponent's choice. Therefore, each player's strategy
should be kept unknown to his opponent. One way to do this is to play
certain strategies by using a random device for selecting a strategy. He
may choose a probability distribution over his set of strategies and then
an associated random probability distribution over the whole set of strate^
gies for the play of the game. Such a probability distribution over the
22
whole set of strategies of a player is called a mixed strategy.
Suppose in the above game, Blue plays strategy 1 with frequency x
and plays strategy 2 with frequency 1-x, and suppose Red plays 1 with
frequency y and plays 2 with frequency 1-y.
Blue
Red
y 1-y
X 1 3
1-x 4 2
The mathematical expectation of Blue is
E(xy) = Ixy / 3x(l-y) / 4(l-x)y / 2(l-x) • (1-y)
= 4xy / X / 2y / 2
=
-4{x-^) (y-^) / 5/2
When E{xy) is written in the above form, it is easily seen that if Blue
takes X = 1/2 he can insure that the expectation will be at least 5/2.
Red can insure the expectation of Blue will be no more than 5/2 by
playing y = 1/4.
Since Blue's maxmin is 2, he will settle for 5/2 and play x = 1/2.
Similarly Red's minmax is -3 and he will reconcile himself to getting
-5/2 and play y = 1/4.
Thus the optimal mixed strategy for Blue is to play strategy 1
with probability 1/2 and strategy 2 with probability 1/2. Red's optimal
23
strategy is to play strategy 1 with probability 1/4 and strategy 2 with
probability 3/4. The value of the game is 5/2. The two optimal stra-
tegies are called the solution of the game.
Mixed strategies will be represented by column matrices. Let
X. be the probability of selecting strategy i. Then a mixed strategy, or
probability distribution X, for Blue, may be represented by the row
vector
X' h x^, . . . , X I2 m
where
X. >
1
i = 1, 2, . . . , m
and
m
?,-'"
Similarly, if y. is the probability of selecting strategy j, then a
mixed strategy or probability distribution Y, for Red, is a column
vector
Y =
n
24
where
y.>0 j = 1, 2, . , n
and
n
j=i J
If X. = 1 for some i, then X is called a pure strategy.
Suppose Blue chooses strategy laid Red chooses mixed strategy
y; the expected pay-off to Blue is
n
h. = T] a..y.
J = l -"
''
th
which is the i component of the column vector
H = AY =
hm
If Red uses strategy j and Blue uses mixed strategy x, the
expected pay-off to Red is
m
k. = ^ a..x.
25
which is the j component of the row vector K', where
K' = X'A = (k,, k,, . .., k ),
1. L. n
If Blue and Red use mixed strategies X and Y respectively, then
the expected pay-off to Blue is
m n
= K'Y = X'H.V = X'AY = 3"" "V a..x.y.
ih jTl ^J ^ J
The following example of the Colonel Blotto Game taken from
Dresher (3, pp. 7-8) demonstrates the application of mixed strategies.
Example: Colonel Blotto Gamie.
Colonel Blotto and his enemy each try to occupy two
posts by distributing their forces suitably. Let us assume
that Colonel Blotto has 4 regiments and the enemy has 3
regiments which are to be divided between the two posts.
Define the pay-off to Colonel Blotto at each post as follows:
If Colonel Blotto has more regiments than the enemy at
the post, Colonel Blotto receives the enemy's regiments
plus one (the occupation of the post is equivalent to cap-
turing one regiment); if the enemy has naore regiments
than Colonel Blotto at the post, then Colonel Blotto loses
one plus his regiments at the post; if each side places the
same number of regiments, it is a draw and each side gets
zero. The total pay-off is the sum of the pay-offs at the
two posts.
Colonel Blotto has 5 strategies, or five different ways
of dividing 4 regiments between the two posts. The enemy
has 4 strategies, or four different ways of dividing his 3
regiments. There are, therefore, twenty ways for the two
sides to distribute their forces.
26
It is evident that if Colonel Blotto places 3 regiments
at the first post and 1 at the second, and if the enemy places
2 regiments at the first post and 1 at the second, then Blotto
wins what amounts to 3 regiments. However, if Colonel
Blotto places 2 regiments at each post and the enemy places
all of his 3 regiments at either post, then Colonel Blotto
loses 2 regiments. The following pay-off matrix sumnnarizes
the payment to Colonel Blotto for each of the twenty possible
distributions:
Colonel Blotto
Strategies
(4,0)
(0,4)
(3,1)
(1.3)
(2.2)
Colonel Blotto Pay-off
Enemiy Strategies
(3,0) (0,3) (2,1) (1,2)
4
1
-1
-2
4
-1
1
-2
In the Colonel Blotto pay-off matrix, if the enemy uses the mixed
strategy
Y =
1/4
1/2
1/4
and Colonel Blotto uses a pure strategy. Blotto' s expectation for each of
his pure strategies is H = AY, or
27
H =
4 2 1 - 2 1/4
4 1 2
1/4
1
1 -1 3 • = 1 3/4
1 1 3
1/2
1/2
2 -2 2 2
1/4
1
where the components of H represent Colonel Blotto' s receipts correS'
ponding to each one of his five pure strategies.
Now, if the two players' strategies are
X =
L
1/4
1/4
1/2
Y =
1/4
1/2
1/4
then Blotto' s expectation is E = X'AY = X'H, or
(1/4, 0, 0. 1/4, 1/2)
2 1/4
1
1 3/4
1/2
1
= 19/16.
Colonel Blotto' s expectation for other combinations of strategies
can be evaluated in a similar fashion.
28
Graphical Representation of Mixed Strategies
It is possible to represent graphically the expectation of a player
as a function of his mixed strategies.
If one player has two strategies and the other has any number of
strategies, it is possible to solve the game graphically in two dinaensions,
Consider a game with pay-off matrix
Red Strategies
R, R.
B.
Blue Strategies
^11 ^12
^21 ^22
Any randomized strategy X = (x , x ) for Blue can be identified with a
point (x , X ) on the segment of length one as in Figure 1. If Blue
chooses (x , X ) and Red chooses strategy R , the pay-off to Blue is
0{X, Ri) = a^^x^ /a^^x^
Geometrically, 0(X, R ) may be represented as the R line joining
a and a . Blue's security level may be represented as the vertical
XX X w
height from (x , x ) to the R line.
1 b 1
29
11
Strategy B
1
i X,
^1^1 ^^12^2
< X,
(1,0) (x^.x^) (0,1)
12
Strategy B.
Figure 1
.
Similarly if (x , x ) is used against R , Blue's security level may
be represented as the vertical height ax / ax.
Blue may maximize his security level against Red's best play by
playing X>^ = (x^'^X2':=).
^21
11
Strategy B
1
(x^^x^^O
Figure 2.
12
22
Strategy B^
Since the two lines intersect at the point ( Qx , x "^ , v) then
^I'l'-'^Z^Z^^"
^21^1* ''
^ZZ^Z' =
^-
Since x -!' = (1 - xy^) the system (11) above may be reduced to
a^^(l-x^^) / a^^x^>. = a^^ / (a^^- a^^)x^>.' = v
a^^(l-X2*) / a^^x^* = a^^ / (a^^- a^^)x^>:^ = v.
The system (12) has solution
^1* = ^22-^2 ^2 = ^r^21
^ll*^ ^22" ^12" ^21 ' ^ll*^ ^22" ^12" ^21
V = a a - a a
11 22 12 21
and
^11'^ ^22" ^12" ^21
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(11)
(12)
(13)
To mininnize Blue's pay-off. Red nnust use a mixed strategy Y =
(y ,y ). The pay-off from these mixed strategies is
0{X,Y) = a^^x^y^ / ^^^^2 ^ ^21^2^1 ^ ^22^2^2
^^l^^ll^l -^ ^21^2^ '^>^2^^1 2^1 '^^22^2^-
The minimax theorem states if both Red and Blue use optimal strategies,
the pay-off is the value of the game v, i. e.
,
(14)
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The values of x *, x *, and v have already been found (13); hence,
equation (15) has the solution
a - a a - a
11 12
_,
ZZ 12
y = _ —- _ and y =
^
^ll'^ ^22" ^12' ^21 ^ ^11'^ ^22" ^12" ^21
Equation (14) above may be represented by a line which is a weighted
average of the lines R and R in our diagram. Since y / y = 1, the
line must always be between R and R and hence must pass through the
point ( fx^is X ^'] , v). For all members of this family of lines except
the horizontal, if Blue chooses either pure strategy B or B his return
will exceed v. This is impossible by the minimax theorem, hence, Red's
optimal strategy may be represented geometrically as the horizontal line
through a minimunn ordinate of the intersections of two of Blue's pure
strategies.
Red's optimal strategy Y--' = (y, *, y-,''') is a weighted average of two
intersecting pure strategy lines R and R which have the minimum ordinate
at the point of their intersection. Therefore,
V = y -KR / y^*R^.
^ s s 't t
3Z
X''-
To find y -'<« and y * let m and n be given by the equations
m = IR - V
s
and n = R^-v
Then
n
y.''
s nn / n
and mm / n
An extension of this graphical analysis to games where one player
has more than two strategies is extremely simple. Consider the case
where Blue has two strategies (B , B ) and Red has six (R , R , . . . , R/ )
Each Red strategy is represented in the diagram below.
Blue Strategy 1 Blue Strategy 2
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If Red wishes to hold Blue down to at most v, he must use a randomized
strategy involving only R and R,, and thus this case is reduced to the
case previously studied.
Lest the reader assume that all games have the same graphical
representation as the one just analyzed, the following examples taken
from Luce and Raiffa (6) present different features that might occur.
A Unique Optimal Strategy
B.
(b) (c)
In (a), Red has a unique optimal mixed strategy. In cases (b) and (c)
strict dominance by strategy B is shown.
"^2
T^
V
f
1
V
Many Optimal Strategies
(a)
1^
V rV
.z=;' >
(c)
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In these cases, Blue's optimal strategy may fall anywhere within the
2.^ interval.
Bennion (2) and Vajda (12) give examples of graphical solutions of
games in three dimensions. Luce and Raiffa (6) present an alternate
method of geometrical representation.
THE FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM OF GAME THEORY
Before proving the minimax theorem the previous discussion is
formalized by the generalization of any two-person zero- sum finite
game Pas follows:
i. There are two players, Blue and Red. Both players are malevolent
(i.e.
,
each is concerned with maximizing his own gains, or mini-
mizing his ow^n losses).
ii. Blue has a set I = (i, , i^, . . . , i ) of m pure strategies.12 m
iii. Red has a set J = (j , j , . . . , j ) of n pure strategies.
x Cd n
iv. Associated with each pair of strategies (i, j) is the pay-off
^(i, j) units from Red to Blue. 0(i, j) is abbreviated by a...
v. Both players are aware of, and intelligent enough to evaluate
accurately, the pay-offs associated with both players' alternative
strategies,
vi. Blue may adopt a mixed strategy by employing i , with
probability x where
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in
\ X. = 1 and X. > for i = 1, 2, , m.
Such a strategy is represented by the row vector
[^X' = fx, , x^, . . . , X1' 2' q
The set of all randomized strategies for Blue is designated by Xm
vii. Similarly, Red's mixed strategy is denoted by a column vector
Y =
yn
where
n
Sy-1
j=i J
y. >
J
for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The set of all randomized strategies for Red are designated by Y
viii. For each mixed strategy pair (X, Y), the pay-off 0(X, Y) is
defined to be
n
m n
0(X. Y) = X'AY = 21 2 ^iVi
i=l j = l ^ J
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ix. The pure strategy game H may be denoted by the triplet
(0, I, J) which designates the two pure strategy spaces I and
J and the pay-off function 0.
The extension of P to spaces of mixed strategies is denoted
by the triplet (0, X , Y ).m n
x. Blue's objective is to select a mixed strategy X from X som
as to maximize his security level (return). This strategy
called the optimal strategy is denoted as X--^. Because the
game is zero- sum. Red's objective is to minimize Blue's
return by the selection of a strategy Y from Y . This strategy
denoted as Y=!^ is the optimal strategy for Red. The set X--'
Y--' is called a solution for the game f.
The following proof of the minimax theorem makes use of a theorem
from Glickman { (5) Lemma 2.5, p. 31).
Lemma;
Let
A =
a ... a
11 In
a , . . . a
ml mn
J
Then either
(i) there exists an element X' = (x, , . . . , x ) of X such that
^ 1mm
a, .X, / a_.x_ / . . . / a .x > for j = 1, . . . , n,
Ij 1 2j 2 mj m - or
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(ii) there exists an element Y = (y, , .... y )
1 n
ay/a.^y-/.../a. y <0 for i = 1, .... m.ill iZ Z m n
Theorem 4:
If X and Y are mixed strategies of the game P, then,
min max 0{X, Y) = v = max min 0{X, Y)
Y X X Y
Proof:
If condition (i) of Lemma Z. 5 holds, there is an element
(x, , . . . , X ) € X such that
1 m na
a, .X, / a_.x_ / . . . / a .x > for j = 1, Z, . . . , n,
Ij 1 Zj Z mj m
and hence for every Y ^ Y
n
n
0(X, Y) = V (a. .x^ / a^.x- / . . . / a .x ) Y. > (16)
^ Ij 1 Zj Z mj m J
J
Since (16) holds for every Y ^ Y ,
min 0{X, Y) >
YfY
n
and, hence,
max min 0(X, Y) >
XtX Y^Ym n
If condition (ii) of Lemma 2. 5 holds, there is an element
(Yi* •••» y )^ Y such that
1 n n
^l>^l ^ \Z^Z ^ -" ^ ^in^n ^ fo^ i = 1. ^' • • • > ^^
and hence there exists for every X^Xm
m
0(X, Y) = S (^lYi / a.^y, / . . . / a.^y^) . X. < (17)
1=1
Since the above holds for every X^X ,m
max 0(X, Y) <
X^Xm
and, hence.
min max 0(X, Y) <> (18)
Y^Y xex
n m
Since either condition (i) or condition (ii) of Lemma 2, 5 holds, then at
least one of the inequalities (17) or (18) must hold, and hence the follow-
ing cannot be true
max min 0(X, Y) < <min max 2)(X, Y) . (19)
XfeX Y£Y YeY XeXm n n m
Let A be the matrix which arises from A by subtracting v fromi
V
each element of A:
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A =
V
a - V, .... a - V
11 In
a - V, .... a - V
ml mn
Let be the expectation function for A , so that for any X and Y that
are members of X and Y respectively,m n
m n
) (X, Y) = y yCa..- v) X.Y.
(X, Y) = 0(X, Y) - V.
(20)
Since the inequalities (19) do not hold for A, the following conditions
do not hold for A .
V
max min (X, Y) < < min max (X, Y)
XtX YCf ^ YCY XeX ^m n n m
(21
Thus, from (20) and (21) the following conditions do not hold:
max min 0(X, Y) - v <0 < min max - v
XOC YCYm n YtY XdXn m
Hence, for every v the following do not hold:
max min 0(X, Y)<v<min max (X, Y)
X^X YtYm n Y6Y Xexn m
(22)
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Since inequalities (22) are false for every v, the relations
max min 0(X, Y) > v 2 min max 0(X, Y) (23)
XkX Y€Y Y€Y X€Xm n n m
are true for every v.
From Theorem 3,
max min 0(X, Y) < min max 0(X, Y) (24)
XeX Y€Y Y€Y X^Xm n n m
Therefore, it follows from (22) and (24) that
max min 0)X, Y) = min max 0(X, Y) = v. (25)
X6X YtY Y^Y X^Xm n n m
SOLVING MATRIX GAMES
From the minimax theorem, it follows that each player has an optimal
strategy. Using an optimal strategy, a player can expect to win (lose) a
fixed amount regardless of the strategy selected by his opponent, and
this fixed amount is as large (small) as it is strategically possible. A
player may win more (lose less) than this fixed amount from (to) his
opponent if his opponent does not use an optimal strategy. A pair of
optimal strategies, one for each player, is the solution for the game.
The value of a game is the average amount v that one player must pay
his opponent if both use their optimal strategies.
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The computations required for the solution of any but the simplest
games are so extensive that it would be virtually impossible to obtain
solutions without the use of automatic computers. The advent of auto-
matic computers has made it possible to obtain an answer to some
problems in a reasonable length of time. This paper will discuss the
solution of games without specific reference to the solution by automatic
computers.
Since the annount of computation required to obtain a solution depends
upon the number of strategies, it is important to reduce their number
whenever possible. Sometimes it is possible to tell by direct inspection
of the matrix that certain strategies will always have probability zero
in an optimal strategy. A poor strategy of a player is defined as some
pure strategy which appears with probability zero in every optimal mixed
strategy of that player. If a player has a poor strategy, that strategy
may be eliminated from the set of pure strategies and the resulting game
will have the same solution.
Poor strategies are found by examining the pay-off matrix for
dominances. Suppose some row of the pay-off matrix A = (a..) is such
that
a.. > a j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
i.e.
,
the elements of some row i are larger than the corresponding
elements of another row k. Then the strategy i of Blue is said to dominate
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strictly strategy k of Blue and strategy k is a poor strategy. However,
for Red, if the elements of a column r are larger than the corresponding
elements of some column s
a. > a. i = 1, 2, . . . , m,
ir IS
then Strategy r strictly dominates strategy s and strategy r is a poor
strategy.
For example, if
""l 7 2
6 2 7
5 1 6
is the pay-off matrix of sonne game, then no optimal strategy
for Blue should assign a positive probability to the third row.
No nnatter what Red does. Blue can improve his pay-off by
choosing the second row rather than the third row. In a simi-
lar manner, since every element of the first column of the
above matrix is less than the corresponding element in the
third column and since Red wants to minimize the pay-off,
then the third column may be eliminated obtaining
1 7
for the simplified game matrix.
The solution of the original game may be obtained by solving the
simplified game. The optimal mixed strategy of the original game
is obtained by assigning probability zero to the poor strategies and
the remaining strategies are assigned the same probability as in the
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solution of the simplified game. Hence, the value of the original game
is the same as the value of the simplified game.
If some strategy k is dominated by a convex linear combination of
strategies r and s, i.e.,
a., < c • a. / (1 -c) • a.ik ir IS
0^ c <1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
then strategy k is a poor strategy and nriay be eliminated simplifying the
computations required to solve the game. Similarly columns nniay also
exhibit convex linear dominance and be eliminated.
For example, consider a game whose pay-off naatrix is
24 o"
8
4 5
Notice that
4 < 1/4 . (24) / 3/4 . (0) and 5 < 1/4 • (O) / 3/4 • (8).
Hence, Blue would never be wise to play strategy three for he
could always do better by dividing between the first two stra-
tegies any probability that he might consider assigning to the
third strategy. Thus the garae might be reduced to a simpler
game whose matrix is
24
8
The following sections will be devoted to the solution of matrix
games by different methods. The first method consists of the algebraic
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solution of a large system of inequalities and equalities. The second
method, which is the most common and is applicable to autonnatic com-
puters, is linear programming. An approximation nnethod of solving
games by fictitious play concludes the section.
For the reader interested in different methods of solving matrix
games, Dresher (3), McKinsey (7), and Willianas (14) present a matrix
solution. Dresher (3) discusses a mapping method and Luce and Raiffa
(6) illustrate the use of differential equations for the solution of matrix
game s
.
To solve a game it suffices to find vectors X and Y whose elements
satisfy the following conditions.
x/x/.../x =1 Y, / Y-) f • f Y =12 m 'l-'Z 'n 1
X. > i = 1, 2, . . . , m y. > j = 1. 2, . . . , n
a, .X, / a.- .x_ / . . . / a .x > v for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n
Ij 1 2j 2 mj m -
Ly/a.,y^/.../a. y -Cv for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,
il 1 iZ' 2 m'n -
m
Algebraic Solution
The usual methods of elementary algebra do not suffice to solve
systems like (26) above containing inequalities as well as equalities.
The minimax theorem guarantees that there is a solution to this system
and the algebraic method enables one to find this solution by separately
(26)
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considering all possible cases that arise when a > sign is replaced by
an = or > sign and the < sign is replaced by an = or < sign. The two
following examples from McKinsey (7) illustrate how this method is
applied.
Example 1:
To find the value and optimal strategies for the game whose
pay-off matrix is
1 -1 1
1 -1 3
1 2 1
find X , X , X , y , y , y and v which satisfy the following conditions
x^ / x^ / X3 = 1 Yi / y^ / 73
= 1
0<x il, 0<x^l, 0<x <1 0<y <1, Oiy^^l, 0<y^<,l
(1) x^ / (-1) x^ / (-1) X3>v (1) y^ / (-1) y^ / (1) y3<v
(-1) x^ / (-1) x^ / (2) x^>v (-1) y^ / (-1) y^ / (3) y^sv
(27)
(1) x^ / (3) x^ / (1) x^^v (-1) y^ / (2) y^ / (1) y^<v.
A solution can be found by separately considering the 2,
cases that arise when the < sign is replaced by an = sign or <
sign and the > sign is replaced by an = sign or > sign.
To solve the above game, replace the last six inequalities
by equalities and the result obtained using elementary algebra
is
x^ = 6/13, x^ = 3/13. x^ = 4/13. y^ = 6/13. y^ = 4/13, y^ = 3/13,
and V = 1 / 3
.
Example 2:
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To find the value and optimal strategies of the ganne whose
pay-off nnatrix is
-2
4
2
Again it suffices to find vectors X and Y which satisfy the
conditions of (27) and which also satisfy
(3) x^ / (-1) x^ / (2) x^ > V (3) y^ / (-2) y^ / (4) y^ < v
(-2) x^ / (4) x^ / (2) x^ > V (-1) y^ / (4) y^ / (2) y^ < V
(4) x^ / (2) x^ / (6) x^ > V (2) y^ / (2)y^ / (6) y^ < v.
However, considering the first case where all six inequalities
are replaced by equalities, no solution for these equations exist
which simultaneously makes x , x , x , y . y and y all
non-negative.
To obtain a solution to the game replace the > by > or = and
^ by < or = in the remaining inequalities and solve the resulting
system. Continuing in this way by trial and error, finally the
case
^^1
- ^2 -^ ^^3 = ^ 3y^ - ^^2 '^ ^Vs ^ ^
-2x^ / 4x^ / 2x^ = V
-y^ / 4y^ / 2y^ = V
4x / 2x / 6x > V 2y^ / ^y^ / oy^ = V
x^ / x^ / X3 = 1 y^ / y^ '^ y3 = 1
which has a solution is found.
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Since 4x / 2x / 6x > v, Red will not include y in his
optimal strategy. This implies y = 0. Since 3y - 2y / 4y
< V, Blue will not include x in his optimal strategy, implying
X = 0. Solve the remaining systenn. The set
X =0, X = 0, x^ = 1 and y = 2/5 , y^ = 3/5, y^ = 0,
and V = 2
satisfies all equalities and inequalities and is non-negative.
Thus, the optimal strategies are x = (0, 0, 1), y = (2/5, 3/5,
0) and the value of the game is 2.
For one wishing to read further on this topic, reference (7) contains
a more complete description and some additional examples worked out
completely.
The algebraic method has the disadvantage that the number of
possible systems of equations grows extremely large for a matrix game
of only medium size. The next method, linear programming, is an
adaptation of the algebraic method but it has the advantage that it moves
from an infeasible solution toward a more feasible solution in a syste-
matic manner until the solution is determined.
Linear Programming
To show that an arbitrary game may be solved by the methods of
linear programming, let a pay-off matrix A = (a..) be given. If Blue
chooses the mixed strategy X' = (x, , . . . , x ) then he can be certain ofIn
obtaining at least
m
min T] a. .x. = v.
J i=l
"^
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Therefore,
a .X / ax / . . . / a .x > v for j = 1, 2,
Ij 1 2j Z raj m — , n
X. / X- / . . . / X = 1 -^ (28]
X , X , . . . , X > 0.12 m
Blue wants to make v as large as possible. This value is not necessarily-
positive, but a constant large enough to make v positive may be added to
all the entries of the pay-off. This increases the value of the game by
the sanae constant but does not change the solution. Therefore, v may
be assumed to be positive and new variables, x. ' = x./v, may be defined.
1. 1
Dividing the inequalities of (28) by v, then
m
2] a..x.' > 1 for j = 1, . .., n (29)
i=l ^-^ ^
and
m
S X.' = 1/v. (30)
i=l ^
The right-hand side of equation (30) must be minimized. Thus, the
problem has been reduced to a linear programming problem in the usual
form.
Repeating the same argument for Red, the set of inequalities
n
y^. a. .y.' <1 for i = 1, . . . , m
J = l -^
-^
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holds, and
n
y.' is to maximized,
J
These two problems are dual to one another; by solving one of
thei-n, the other is solved implicitly. Having found x.--'* and y.*' and
m n
the minimum of y> , x.=i-' which equals the maximum of 2] y.''^' we have
i=l j = l
the value v of the game;
x.=!=' • V = x.-'' and y.'"'^ • v = y.'--
1 1 1 1
indicate the best strategies, constituting a solution.
Example:
The Colonel Blotto Game (page 19) may be solved by
linear programming.
Three units may be added to each element of the
pay-off matrix without changing the solution. The resul-
ting pay-off matrix becomes
A =
7 3
3 7
4 2
2 4
1 1
5 4
4 5
6 3
3 6
5 5
The value of the ganne is increased by three but the optimal
strategies remain the same.
Denote any (pure or mixed) strategy for Blue (Blotto)
by the row vector
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fiX' =/x,, x_, x_, x^, X 3]
so that
X. > for i = 1, 2, .... 5
1
(31)
and
X / X / X / X / X = L (32)
Blue's expectation against each of Red's four strategies is
given respectively by the elements of the column vector
A'X =
7x. / 3x, / 4x_ / 2x. / lx_
i Z 3 4 D
3x, / 7x-, / 2x_ / 4x^ / lx_12 3 4 5
5x^ / 4x^ / Gx^ / 3x^ / 5x^
4x^ / 5x^ / 3x^ / 6x^ / 5x
Let V denote the smallest element of the vector, or their
common value if there is no unique simallest element. Hence,
7x^ / 3x, / 4x_ / 2x^ / Ix >v
3x, / 7x, / 2x, / 4x^ / Ix > V
i Z 3 4 D
5x, / 4x^ / 6x, / 3x^ / 5x^ > v12 3 4 5
4x, / 5x_ / 3x_ / 6x . / 5x_ > v12^45
(33;
Blue wishes to choose his strategy X so as to maximize v.
This can be done by minimizing (1/v), Change notation as
follows:
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X.' = x./v and m = 1/v.
1 1
Since v is positive, the division of (31) and (33) by v
gives
X.' > for i = 1, Z, . . ., 5
1 -~
and
7x/ / 3x ' / 4x ' / 2x/ / X • > 1
1 Z 3 4 5
3x/ / 7x • / Zx ' / 4x • / X ' > 1
i ^ J 4 D
5x, ' / 4x ' / 6x • / 3x ' / 5x • ^ 1
i Z J 4 b
4x, ' / 5x ' / 3x ' / 6x V / 5x ' > 1
i Z 3 4 D
Then Blue wants to determine x.' for i = 1, Z, . . . , 5
subject to the constraints of (34) so that
X ' / x_' / x^ ' / X.' / x_ = mI —
'4
' "5
(34)
is a minimum. Therefore, A's problem reduces to a linear
programming problem which can be solved by the sinnplex
method, or by other methods. After finding x =:=', x =i^', x -!='
,
x *', X *' and m, Blue may find his optimal strategy X-'' by
X.* = x.'l^'/m for i = 1, . . . , 5,
1 1
Blue's optimal strategy for the Colonel Blotto Game is
X*' = [4/9, 4/9, 0, 0, 1/9] . (35)
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Red's problem is the dual of Blue's problem. Denoting
Red's strategy by
Y' = [y^. y^. Vy y^]
so that
y^ > for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and y^ / y^ / y^ / y^ = l
Red's expectation is the negative of the column vector.
AY =
7y^ / 3y^ / 5y^ / 4y~
3y^ / ly^ / 4y^ / 5y^
4y^ / 2y^ / 6y^ / 3y^
2y^ / 4y^ / 3y^ / 6y^
y^ / y3^5y3/5y^
Let V denote the largest element of the vector or their common
value if there is no unique largest elenaent. Hence,
7y^ / Sy^ / Sy^ / 4y^ < V
3yi / "^^2 '^ ^^3 -^ ^>'4 ^
^
4y^ / Zy^ / 6y^ / 3y^ < V
2yi ^ ^^Z ^ ^^3 ^ ^Y^<^
y^ ^ ^1^ ^^3 '^ ^^4 ^^
Red wishes to choose his strategy Y so as to minimize v.
This can be done by maximizing 1/v. Change the notation again
y.' = y./v and M = 1/v.
J J
Then Red wishes to determine
so that
Yj' >0 Vz >^ ^3 ^^ ^4 ^°
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-^Yi ' '^ ^^z'
/^ Sy^'
3Yi ' ^ ^^z' / 4y3'
4y^ • / Zy,' / 6Y3'
2Yi ' ^ ^^z' /3y3.
Y^ •/ y,' /5y3'
/ 4y^
/ 5y^
/ 6y^
-^ 5y,
< 1
< 1
< 1
< 1
< 1
and so that
Yl' / Y^' / Y3' / Y4' / Y5' = M
is a nriaximum. Red's problem has been reduced to a linear
programming problem and he can find his optimal strategy Y-l*
by
y.* = y.*'/m for j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
J J
Red's optimal strategy is
Y*' = [^1/18, 1/18, 4/9, 4/9] . (36)
When these optimal mixed strategies are used on the
original pay-off matrix then the value of the game is 14/9 to
Blotto.
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[4/9. 4/9, 0, 0,1/9]
4 2 1 1/18
4 1 2 1/18
1 -1 3 4/9
-1 1 3 4/9
-2 -2 2 2J
= 14/9 (37)
Bennion (2), Glicksman (5), Tucker (11), and Vajda (12 and 13)
have a more complete development of game theory as a linear problem.
Liuce and Raiffa (6) develop an alternate proof of the minimax theorem
as a consequence of the duality theorem of linear programming.
Iterative Solution of a Game by Fictitious Play
The iterative method can be characterized by the fact that it rests
on the traditional statistician's philosophy of basing future decisions on
relevant past history. One might expect a statistician, perhaps ignorant
of game theory, to keep track of his opponent's past plays and choose at
each play the optimal pure strategy against the mixture represented by
all of the opponent's past plays.
This method can best be illustrated by an example. Consider the
game defined by the pay-off matrix
Red Strategies
R^ R R.
1
Blue Strategies B
B
3 U
2 3
2 3
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1
where B , B , and B- represent Blue's strategies and R , R , and R
Red's strategies.
Assunne that Blue begins the series of plays by selecting strategy B
and Red chooses the pure strategy R . At step two, Blue should choose
the pure strategy that is best against Red's mixed strategy to this point
(i.e., against R Blue chooses B ). Red likewise chooses the pure
mixed strategy that is best against Blue's mixed strategy to this point
(i.e., against B Red chooses R ). The process is then repeated at
each step. The player chooses the optinnal pure strategy against his
opponent's mixed strategy to that point. If this instruction is ambiguous
because of non-uniqueness, the player may choose any one of the
possible pure strategies which satisfy the requirement.
The column headings for the following table are defined as follows.
The number of the play is designated by N and i(N) represents the pure
th
strategy chosen by Blue on the N play. B is equal to the total receipts
of Blue after N plays if Blue uses his B strategy constantly, and simi-
larly for B and B . Likewise, j(N) represents the pure strategy chosen
th
by Red on the N play and R represents the receipts of Red after N
plays if Red uses his R strategy constantly. v(N) is the least that Blue
can expect to receive on the average, after N plays while v(N) is the
most that Blue can expect to receive on the average after N plays.
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v(N) = 1/N min R.
J
v(N) = -1/N max B.
N i(N) j{N) Blue Expects Red Expects v(N) v{N)
B R
1
R. R,
1 B
z B
3 B
4 B
5 B
6 B
7 B
8 B
9 B
10 B
11 B
12 B
13 B
;4 B
15 B
16 B
17 B
18 B
19 B
20 B
r!
r:
r:
R^
R^
r:
r:
r:
r:
r:
r:
r:
r:
r:
r'
r!
1 4 2 - 1 - 2 - 3 1. 000 4.000
2 8 4 - 5 - 2 - 4 1.000 4. 000
4 8 7 - 9 - 2 - 5 .667 2.667
6 8 10 -13 - 2 - 6 .500 2. 500
8 8 13 -15 - 5 - 6 1.000 2.600
10 8 16 -17 - 8 - 6 1. 000 2.667
13 9 16 -19 -11 - 6 . 857 2. 286
16 10 16 -21 -14 - 6 .750 2. 000
19 11 16 -22 -16 - 9 1.000 2. Ill
22 12 16 -23 -18 -12 1. 200 2. 200
25 13 16 -24 -20 -15 1.364 2.272
28 14 16 -25 -22 -18 1.500 2.333
31 15 16 -26 -24 -21 1.615 2,385
34 16 16 -27 -26 -24 1.714 2.429
37 17 16 -28 -28 -27 1.800 2.467
40 18 16 -29 -30 -30 1.813 2.500
41 22 18 -30 -32 -33 1.765 2.412
42 26 20 -31 -34 -36 1.722 2.333
43 30 22 -32 -36 -39 1.684 2.263
44 34 24 -33 -36 -42 1.650 2.200
It can be shown that v is the greatest lower bound of v(N) and the
least upper bound of v(N). This fact insures that by carrying the
approximation far enough, the value v can be found to any degree of
accuracy.
V = lim v(N) = lim v(N)
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By considering the nunnber of times each pure strategy is played
in N steps of the above approximation methods, an approximation to
an optimal strategy rnay be found. Thus in the first eight rows of
the above table, Blue plays strategy B once, strategy B three times,
and strategy B four times; hence, an approximation to an optimal
strategy for P is
X= (1/8, 3/8, 4/8).
After N steps, an approximation to an optimal strategy will be
N N
X(N) = 1/N ^ i(K), Y(N) = 1/N 2 J(K).
K=l K=l
For the preceding game the approximate optimal strategies are:
X(20) = (13/20, 3/20, 4/20), Y(20) = (6/20, 4/20, 10/20),
It can be verified that the exact optimal strategies are:
X* = (11/20, 4/20, 5/20), Y':= = (8/20, 7/20, 5/20).
If
lim X(N) and lim Y(N) (3 8]
exist, then these limits are a solution of the game. However, the
strategies X(N) and Y(N) may not converge. If the strategies fail to
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converge, the cause is generally the oscillating character of the X(N)
and Y(N) around a solution. It can be shown, however, that, in any
case, every convergent subsequence of (38) converges to an optimal
strategy.
Historically, the method of fictitious play was proposed as a means
for actually computing the value of a game. However, as a computa-
tional procedure, the method is impractical since the rate of convergence
is extremely slow. A number of variants of the method have been pro-
posed which have better convergence properties; however, the method
only remains of general theoretical importance. The convergence of
this method is proved in Gale (4).
TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The following sections contain a brief description of topics which
the reader may wish to investigate further. References where more
details may be found are listed.
N-Person Games
The previous discussion has considered only two-person zero-sum
games but the problem may be extended to any number of players. A
finite n-person zero- sum game may be thought of as a game in which
player. P., makes just one choice of a strategy, X., from a finite set.
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C, of possible strategies without being informed about the choice of
any of the previous players. After each of the n-players has chosen a
strategy, the pay-off for each player P. is
(x , X , . . . , X ).
1 1 <i n
Since the game is zero- sum, the pay-off functions
, ,
. . .
,
satisfy
n
2 »i(-i V = °-
1=1
The theory of n-person games is largely concerned with the questions
of what combinations of coalitions will be formed and what payments the
players can be expected to make to each other as inducements to join
the various coalitions. More than half of von Neumann's book (9) is
devoted to this topic.
Non- Zero-Sum Games
Until now^ all discussion has assumed that the gain of one player is
the loss of another (zero- sum), but this is not true in all competitive
situations. The bargaining of a labor union and an industrial conapany
over a contract may be considered as a two-person game, but it is not
zero- sum for the agreement over a contract is advantageous to both and
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the shut-down of a plant is disadvantageous to both, but not necessarily
to the same extent. Some non-zero- sum games may be simplified by
adding an additional player who will act as a "banker" to keep the pay-off
zero- sum. Then the game may possibly be solved by n-person game
theory. Nash (8) has dealt extensively with this area of game theory.
Once one leaves two-person zero-sum games, however, there are
serious theoretic assumptions. A major obstacle in developing n-person
and non-zero- sum game theory is the development of a satisfactory
theory of coalition formation and the assumptions that are made about
connmunication and collusion among players.
Infinite Games
Not every game situation can be described in terms of only a finite
number of strategies. A very simple example is the problem of a
manufacturer who is faced with the problem of how much of his product
to put into a package to compete favorably with other manufacturers and
thus to sell many packages, but he does not want to put so much into the
package as not to make a profit.
The solution of an infinite game is not straightforward; in fact,
there are infinite games where no solution exists. Since infinite games
cannot be treated with the generality of finite games, the solution of
infinite gannes -svill not be discussed in this paper. Dresher (3) and
McKinsey (7) discuss infinite games in some detail.
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A two-person zero-sum game is a conflict of interest which involves
two players, hence the name two-person. One player wins what the other
loses, thus the sum of their gains is zero. A game is a collection of
rules which determines what the players may do.
Two-person zero-sum games are in one sense a special case of
linear programming problems. Solving a game amounts to solving a
set of equations for non-negative variables in such a way as to maximize
(minimize) some function.
The mathematical formulation of a ganne is illustrated by the
reduction of the game NIM from extensive to normal form. The concept
of pure strategies is introduced and games with saddle -points are investi-
gated. Games of perfect information are shown to have saddle -points.
Games without saddle -points are discussed and mixed strategies are
introduced. The Colonel Blotto game illustrates an application of mixed
strategies. The geometrical properties of mixed strategies are illustrated
by their graphical representation. The generalization of two-person zero-
sum games precedes the proof of the minimax theorem.
The solution of matrix games by algebraic methods, linear programming
and fictitious play is illustrated. The report concludes with a section of
topics for further investigation.

